CONTENTS
[A1]
Foreword
1. Introduction
2 Scope
3. Normative References
4, Definitions
5 A Risk management Approach
6. Threat Scenarios
6.General
6.2 Categorization
6.3
Incident Scenarios
6.4
Identification
of hazards
7. Stakeholders in an Incident
7.1. Categories of personnel
7.2 Targets
to be protected
8. Selection
of PPE in CBRN incidents
8.1 PPE for Duty holders
8.2 PPE for Initial responders
8.3 PPE
for Professional CBRN responders
8.4 PPE for Emergency Services
9. Protection
10. Requirements for testing
10.1. General Requirements
10.2. Specific CBRN Requirements
10.3. Marking
11. Training
Annex A
CBRN RISK
ASSESSMENT
Annex B
HAZARD RATING TABLE
Annex
C
Examples of the magnitude of
hazards
Annex
D
Recommendations
Annex
E
Human
toxicological data
Bibliography
The decision to produce this CWA
(CEN Workshop Agreement) addressing CBRN PPE was formally accepted at the
Workshop's kick-off meeting on 2008-06-17.
The document has been developed
through the collaboration of a number of contributing partners in the
Manufacture, Use, Testing or those Providing CBRN PPE Industries. This CWA has
received the support of representatives of each of these sectors. A list of
company experts who have supported the document's contents may be obtained from
the CEN/ISSS Secretariat.
This CWA is based upon the CEN
template for the development of CEN Workshop Agreements, under the general
title CBRN PPE
1. Introduction
Following a resolution being
adopted by CEN BT WG 161 Security and Protection of the Citizen, which related
to the lack of any guidance on CBRN PPE, consideration was given by DG Justice,
Law and Security, who then agreed to make available the funding for this
Workshop Agreement.
It was agreed that NEN would
provide the Secretariat and the EU Commission appointed Mr. David Matthews (UK)
as the Expert to the Workshop.
The reasons are clear, with the
ever increasing number of natural disasters, industrial accidents and terrorist
attacks, it was stated that there were no specific standards or guides on CBRN
PPE for Manufacturers, Users, Test Houses and those who determine it necessary
to provide CBRN PPE which is tested and certified, for selection and use in
such events.
As far as legal obligations are
concerned, all PPE for employees at work must comply with the requirements of
the PPE Directives 89/686/EEC or 93/42/EEC, taking into account the design and
testing. For the use of PPE the EU Directive 89/656/EEC has to be complied
with. Directive 89/656/EEC excludes PPE for use by Emergency Services.
Consideration was also given to the
Medical Services Directive 93/42/EEC with regard to the design and testing of
CBRN PPE.
This Directive has many more
Notified Bodies that those covered by the PPE Directive, this can significantly
reduce the costs of testing. To overcome the problems of self certification
self declaration, any CBRN PPE shall be tested and certified by an accredited
third party.
At the scene of any incident/event
(that turned out to be a CBRN incident) those affected may need immediate
assistance in getting away from the hot zone. To achieve this in a hostile
environment simple but effective CBRN PPE is required.
In certain scenarios rescues might
not be possible until a full dynamic risk assessment has been carried out, this
may mean first responders donning full ensemble CBRN PPE to carry out such a
risk assessment.
The Incident Commander at any such
incident would need to give consideration to keeping all persons affected at
the incident site within a designated quarantine area.
The present Standards affording
protection against CBRN threats for civilian use are British Standard 8467
(protective clothing), BS 8468 (respiratory protection), NFPA 1971:2007 with
the CBRN Option and an Israeli hood standard certified for CBRN protection (PM-750
Personal Protection Respirator).
There are no standards to give guidance
regarding the requirements and testing for proper CBRN PPE, for all categories
of personnel who could be involved. This Workshop Agreement makes reference to
standards, standards-like documents, legislation, Guidance, that should be
taken into consideration in order to mitigate the effects (direct or indirect)
and consequences of CBRN events on EU Citizens.
In the initial stages of any CBRN
event/incident, it is most unlikely that First Responders, Duty Holders,
Employers or Victims would recognize what was involved; therefore the need for
preventive CBRN PPE protection has to be considered. There may be occasions
when it is imperative to evacuate large numbers of potential victims, who might
be contaminated; the Management of Emergency Services at such incidents is
addressed by CEN Workshop Agreement 44.
In the initial risk assessment
conducted by the responsible person, consideration should be given to the
protection for the untrained citizen faced with unknown but presumed pathogenic
or toxic substances.
Such protection is defined as non
occupational defence during evacuation or emergency movement through the
presumed or confirmed hazard to an area of safety. In such circumstances,
protection is identified as any device issued by the responsible person/duty
holder, with self supply and is recognised as a broad base but limited
protection.
The
target audience of this document is therefore widespread and diverse. All
stakeholders will need to consider the potential for such a CBRN incident and
its impact on their premises and workers, in compliance with applicable
regulations.
The members of the Workshop
determined, following a number of debates, that they would develop CBRN PPE to
protect the citizen by equipping Professional First Responders, Duty holders,
Responsible Persons, Victims and members of the public who were the
responsibility of those Occupiers, who had a legal responsibility towards them.
The issue of CBRN
protection for the citizens of the EU was deteremined to be too politically
sensitive for the CEN WA to determine any resolution.
It was felt that to make recommendations[A2] that this CEN WA would address all EU Citizens[A3] being provided with CBRN protection would not receive
support from any of the EU Member States Governments, and be political
unacceptable. The decision was therefore taken to report this
matter to DG JLS, this was done by the Chairman at a meeting week of 14th
September 2009. This resulted in a new proposal
being prepared by NEN and the 2 nominated Experts, seeking support from DG JLS
for a comprehensive Feasibility study to ascertain present gaps in the
provision of CBRN protection for the Citizen and further areas regarding CBRN
Detection, Decontamination and protection of
First Responders.
Furthermore, there is presently no
CEN Technical Committee, or indeed mechanism that can handle Ensemble
standards, which is the compulsory route when addressing functional PPE that
should protect adequately against CBRN. This is a matter that the Commission
will need to consider. With the introduction of the new CEN TC 391 Security and
Protection of the Citizen, it is felt this could be an avenue where such
Ensemble Standards could be developed.
However, the workshop gave priority
to all individuals who might be engaged in a CBRN incident regardless whether
or not these are professional responders or civilians who by job description
have a duty to fulfil in such events.
This
CEN Workshop Agreement aims at increasing the protection of those initially and
primarily involved with any CBRN incident. This will cover Emergency
Responders, Duty Holders, and Responsible Persons, Employers and Victims or
potential victims. All of these people are potentially at risk from a CBRN
incident. We
recognize that there are many potential types of CBRN event/incidents and this CWA
has attempted to utilize those risks identified in the IMPACT study conducted
by TNO for the EU Commission as a basis for threat levels.
INSERT TABLE FROM
HUUB HERE
[A4] This
CWA provides both general guidance and codes of practice and requirements,
testing, marking and certification of PPE to be applied in CBRN situations.
C
> Chemical
Threads by toxic, flammable or explosive chemicals
B
> Biologic Agents
Threads by fungi, bacteria, viruses or sub-viral particles which may cause
health problems
R
> Radiologic Agents
Thread by compounds which emit radiation which may cause health problems
Nuclear
> Atomic degradation Agents
Threads by agents which contain elements whos nuclei degrade, emitting
radiation and form new and potential health threatening compounds or elements
This
CWA gives guidance on selection, use, care and maintenance (SUCAM), as well as
safety and effectiveness of PPE for CBRN scenarios[A5] .
It
contains guidance and risk assessment templates, which
will allow those at risk
to determine what level of risk this could be and the PPE required to protect
the designated groups we have identified.
Additional
issues such as instruction, training and use of PPE are also addressed.
The
management of any CBRN incident requires a variety of skills
and those persons responsible should also refer to CEN
Workshop Agreement 44 Emergency Services
Management (ESM)
3 Normative and informative references.
The
following normative documents contain provisions which, through reference in
this text, constitute provisions of this CWA. For dated references, subsequent
amendments to, or revisions of, any of these publications may) not apply.
However, parties to agreements based on this CWA are encouraged to investigate
the possibility of applying the most recent editions of the normative documents
indicated below. For undated references, the latest edition of the normative
document referred to applies.
3.1 Normative references
CEN WA 44 - Emergency
Services Management
This CEN WA is applicable
when considering the roles all of those recognised as having a role whilst
attending a CBRN event.
3.2 Informative
references[A6] [A7] [A8] [A9]
The following standards are
mentioned other than in a normative sense:
EN 529***
Note
Standards and other documents
that may be relevant for the application of this standard or explaining the
background on the products, systems or circumstances of the application, are
listed in the bibliography at the end of the annexes of this CWA.
4. Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this CEN
Workshop Agreement the following terms and definitions[A10] apply.
Biological agents
Biological materials that are capable of causing an
acute disease or long term damage to the human body
Biological terrorism agents
Liquid or particulate agents that consist of a
biologically derived toxin or pathogen used to inflict lethal or incapacitating
casualties, generally on a civilian population as a result of a terrorist
attack
CBRN agents
all
substances of chemical, biological or radiological origin that are affecting
human health by exposure of any kind
CBRN PPE
all
hardware that can be used by an individual to protect against the exposure to
CBRN agents
Chemical flash fire
the ignition of a flammable and ignitable vapour or
gas that produces an outward expanding flame front, as those vapours or gases
burn
NOTE
This burning and expanding flame front (fire ball) will produce both thermal
and kinetic energy to the environment.
Chemical terrorism agents
liquid, solid, and gaseous and vapour chemical agents
and dual-use industrial chemicals used to inflict lethal or incapacitating
casualties, generally on a civilian population as a result of a terrorist
attack
CEN BT WG 161 Security and Protection of the
Citizen addressed this matter and determined that a Citizen is;
Any person within the EU boundaries, legally or
illegally, it also referred to animals, which this CEN WA has not addressed.
Dual use industrial
chemicals
highly toxic industrial
chemicals that have been identified as mass casualty threats that could be used
as weapons of terrorism to inflict casualties, generally on a civilian
population, during a terrorist attack.
NOTE
Dual-use
industrial chemicals can be liquid, solid, or gaseous agents.
Emergency response team
firefighters and other first responders that are
trained and equipped to response to incidents involving the accidental release
of hazardous materials
Hot Zone
Management is required to control access to and from
the incident scene, control movement of contaminated victims, provide safe
working methods for responders and contain the release of any substances.
The boundary of the hot zone (the hot line) shall be
clearly marked with tape or by other means to indicate the high risk to
responders
To secure the immediate scene, exclude non-essential
personnel and provide a measure of protection for personnel working within the
area. Factors to take into account are:
(1) The boundary of the Inner Cordon will be
determined jointly by the Police, Fire Service and Ambulance Service using all
available information.
(2) All those entering or leaving the Inner Cordon
will report to a designated cordon access and egress point, which will be
controlled by a designated commander, who will register entry and exit. This
will ensure that, at all times, people within the Inner Cordon can be accounted
for in the event of an escalation of the incident.
(3) Personnel entering the Inner Cordon are also
checked to ensure that they have the appropriate level of Personal Protection
Equipment (PPE) and have been briefed on the evacuation signal, hazards,
control measures and any other extant issues which they need to be aware.
d. Set up Forward Control Points (FCPs) for each
agency and establish a routine for inter-agency coordination meetings; where
possible, the FCPs should be collocated.
The warm zone surrounds the hot zone and is the area
that presents only a minimal hazard to personnel. The warm zone is where
decontamination is conducted. The boundary of the warm zone the contamination
control line, shall be marked by appropriate means to indicate the potential
risk to anyone entering the zone
An Outer Cordon around the vicinity of the incident
to control access to a much wider area around the site. This will allow the
emergency services and other agencies to work unhindered and, where
appropriate, in privacy. Access through the Outer Cordon for essential
non-emergency service personnel will be through a Scene Access Control Point
(SACP). The Outer Cordon may then be further supplemented by an external
Traffic Cordon (TC), which will be used by the Police to redirect traffic,
control traffic flows and clear key routes into the incident.
Cold Zone
ADD DIAGRAM HERE SENT
SEPERATELY OF ZONES
Stakeholder[A15]
We
have already addressed the CEN BT WG 161 definition of Citizen, so stakeholder will include aAny
citizen, responder, duty holder, employee or others
affected by a CBRN incident
Note: See section 7.
·
Fatality
·
Casualty
·
Sufferer
·
wounded
5. Risk management approach
Toxic Industrial
Materials (TIMs) are used across a broad range of industries and are often
relatively easily accessible. Due to their wide use, TIMs are widely available
both in the EU and outside.
In order to successfully address the broad
range of possible TIMs security issues, a risk-management approach is needed
based on vulnerability[1] and threat[2] assessments in
line with existing EU regulations
Ø
The assessments being made must acknowledge the lack
of internal borders within the EU. For example, due account must be taken of
the possibility of acquiring materials in one state and carrying out attacks in
another;
Ø
A comprehensive set of mainly safety related EU
legislation exists which are the basis of any risk assessment. Specific safety
and security concerns should be addressed separately and in addition to the
usual risk assessment.
Ø
The schedules of chemicals
included in the Chemical Weapons Convention[3], the Seveso II directive and NATO's International
Task Force 25 (ITF-25) list of hazardous chemicals could serve as the basis for
the identification and prioritisation of TIMs and CBRN warfare agents. Lists
of chemicals already existing within the Member States should be taken into
account as well.
The risk management
process should lead to the identification of toxic agents which may be used for
malicious purposes and the consequences of incidents involving such agents. The
vulnerability assessment should be conducted based on the development of
scenarios, though it is important to underline that so-called "worst case
scenarios" may not be adequate with a view to assessing the state of
preparedness and protection to low-impact incidents, which may nevertheless
cause significant psychological, health and economic effects. The needs should
be based on agreed
methods and criteria taking the security concern at the EU level into account.
They would also
need to take into consideration the basic principle that the danger stemming
from a specific toxic agent is to a large extent dependant on the amount and
degree of exposure. Toxicity in itself will seldom if ever be a sufficient
criterion for singling out a specific chemical agent.
Note
All carcinogenic
substances by definition have no limit values, hence there is no permissible
exposure level.
CWA CBRN PPE.
Figure 1 Intention of this document - Definition of CBRN PPE; context within CBRN
protective measures
6. Threat Scenarios
6.1 General
CBRN events make stakeholders dependent on each
other, as no state can have adequate intelligence and early warning of its own.
Bio-agents are readily available in the
modern world and are relatively easy to produce, store and transport from one
country to another. At the same time, they can be toxic, transmissible and
lethal. Some have a long period of incubation, and many items involved in
biotechnology are dual use, thus difficult to ban. The physical security of
biological agents may be very poor in a number of facilities, with unlocked refrigerators
and simple fences without alarm systems surrounding the facilities. Even with
efficient border controls it cannot be excluded that illicit trafficking of
materials of mass destruction is a possibility.
It is almost impossible to detect and deter
the movement and/or transfer of a small quantity of dangerous infectious
agents. It is very difficult to forecast consequences of a bioterrorist attack.
Chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial
chemicals (TICs) are another category of agents that poses a threat to our
societies. Chemical warfare agents are chemicals with no other use than use in
armed conflict, while toxic industrial chemicals are first chemicals that have
a peaceful use, while being very toxic and can thus be used in a conflict.
Because of the barriers that exist to produce
high quality chemical warfare agents, terrorists have turned to alternatives.
These so called Improvised Chemical Devices (ICDs) have a lower toxicity than
classical warfare agents and are often characterized by a simple delivery
system. ICDs are therefore less dangerous than a high quality agent delivered
by a sophisticated delivery system, but remain very dangerous.
A final group of agents are the radiological
agents. Basically, there are two groups of use of the agent. The first group
are radiological dispersion devices (RDD) that combine explosives with
radiological sources, the so called dirty bomb. The explosion disperses small
radioactive particles that can be inhaled or contaminate areas and buildings.
The second group are radiating devices. A radio active source is placed
(hidden) and will radiate people passing by. Although the damage inflicted is
probably lower than the damage from inhalation with a RDD, it still is a very
dangerous weapon than can inflict serious injuries and large scale unrest in
society.
Note:
Annex A (Informative), Annex B (Informative) and Annex C (Informative) give
guidance on risk assessment based on threat scenarios.
6.2 Categorization
CBRN is an acronym meaning chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear.
C- Chemical: Chemical gases, vapours and
particles of chemical warfare agents and
toxic industrial materials.
B- Biological: Biological agent particles
such as micro-organisms or toxin products.
R- Radiological: Radioactive particles such
as particles carrying alpha or beta radioactive isotopes dispersed by various
means such as a radiological dispersive device, also known as a dirty bomb.
N- Nuclear: Radioactive material such as the
radioactive particles transported/dispersed from a detonation involving a
nuclear reactor/fuel, a nuclear weapon, or a nuclear weapons component or
component pre-cursor.
6.2.1
Biological threats
Bioterrorism agents/diseases are defined in
three categories:[4]
-
Category A comprises high priority agents
that include organisms that pose a risk to national security because they can
easily be disseminated or transmitted from person to person; result in high
mortality rates and have the potential for major public health impact; might
cause public panic and social disruption; and require special action for public
health preparedness. The CDC, Centre of Disease Control in the US) lists the
following under Category A: Anthrax (bacillus anthracis), Botulism (Clostridium
botulinum toxin), plague (Yersinia pestis), Smallpox (variola major), Tularemia
(Francisella tularensis) and Viral hemorrhagic fevers (filoviruses e.g. Ebola,
Marburg and arenaviruses e.g. Lassa, Machupol.
-
Category B diseases/agents are defined as
those that are moderately easy to disseminate; result in moderate morbidity
rates and low mortality rates; and require specific enhancements of CDCs
diagnostic capacity and enhanced disease surveillance.
Category
B includes: Brucellosis (Brucella species); Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens;
Food safety threats (e.g. Salmonella species, Escherichian coli 0157:H7,
Shigella); Glanders (Burkholderia mallei) Melioidosis (Burkholderia
pseudomallei);Psittacosis (Chlamydia psittaci); Q fever (Coxiella burnetii);
Ricin toxin from Ricinus communis (castor beans); Staphylococcal enterotoxin B;
Typhus fever (Rickettsia prowazekii); Viral encephalitis (alphaviruses e.g.
Venezuelan equine encephalitis, eastern equine encephalitis, western equine
encephalitis; Water safety threats (e.g. Vibrio cholera, Cryptosporidium),
Influenza (H1N1).
-
Category C, are defined as emerging
pathogens that could be engineered for mass dissemination in the future because
availability; ease of production and dissemination; and potential for high
morbidity and mortality rates and major health impact. The CDC list mentions
emerging infectious diseases such as Nipah virus and hanta virus.
6.2.2 Chemical threats
Chemical scenarios include:
- deliberate release of
illegally obtained or manufactured chemical warfare agents
- the release of purchased
or stolen industrial chemicals;
- attacks on chemical
manufacturing plants, storage sites or transport vehicles;
- malicious use of
chemicals to contaminate food or water sources.
- industrial chemical
accidents.
6.2.3 Radiological/nuclear threats[A19]
Threat by compounds which emit radiation which may cause health
Hazards
In the previous sections,
different aspects and variables of the threat spectrum were discussed. When we
look at the threat spectrum and realize how many different variables need to be
considered main drivers of an incident, the threat spectrum seems enormous and
unmanageable. When we would consider 25 different agents, 10 different delivery
methods, 10 different types of targets, 5 different levels of resilience, and 4
different stages of readiness and just ignore all the other variables, it would
still give 50.000 different combinations! Even when 90% of these combinations
would be unfeasible, technical not realistic or not possible for other reasons,
it would still leave us with 5.000 combinations.
This is the reason why
scenario sets are developed. These sets try to cover as much as possible from
the threat spectrum with a limited number of scenarios. Scenario sets can be
divided into three categories. The first set consists of military scenarios and
includes different scenarios with classical agents and non conventional agents
for different missions. An example of such a set is the ITF 137 Chemical, Biological and
Radiological Scenarios for Operations Other Than War. The second set consists
of scenarios for civil use with conventional agents (chemical warfare agents
and TICs). Examples of this type of sets are the IMPACT scenarios and the US
National Planning Scenarios. The final set of scenarios uses conventional and
non conventional (improvised) agents, non lethal agents, hoaxes and is the most
complete set of scenarios for civil use. An example of this set is the IB
Consultancy CBRN Planning Scenarios Collection.
Scenarios can be used for
different purposes. They can be used for planning, training, procurement (of
PPE and other equipment), design of security measures and policy development.
When a scenario is combined with a specific object, modelling can be used to
estimate the impact of a certain scenario and to test counter measures (such as
PPE) in a virtual environment. The modelling can provide the user with
concentration time profiles (CT profiles) that can be used as an input to toxicological
models to determine impact on people.
- CBRN warfare, CBRN
terrorism, Accidents with CBRN materials, diseases refer to IMPACT scenarios,
as examples regarding what could happen
in terrorist scenarios.
- Incident scenarios qualitatively
All toxic substances shall be considered here: Chemical, Biological (living as
well as dead material, causing contagious as well as non contagious disease) as
well as radiological agents. We exclude however the protection against the
effects of a nuclear weapon detonation (if needed, an explanation why could
be inserted here.)
- Identification of
hazard; intoxication mechanism, way of penetration into body. All the porte d
entree of the human body are of relevance; respiratory tract, skin, mucous
tissue, eyes. PPE will however not protect against the intake of poisonous food
or beverages. Also the protection PPE could provide against infection by vectors (insect bites) will not be
covered.
- Incident scenarios quantitatively; concentration & duration.
Any
CBRN incident will occur over a period of hours to weeks. The duration of PPE
is limited. Therefore, this aspect needs to be considered and addressed.
6.4
Identification of hazards;
Type of hazards
Dissemination of agent, gases/vapours, liquids, droplets, aerosols
Vector (transportation mode)
Target
Indication or alert of event
Effects
Evolution of the scenario
Duration of danger (persistency)
7. Stakeholders
in an Incident
7. 1. Categories
of stakeholders
-
7.1.1Duty holders ;
with general, site related, non CBRN specific, operational responsibility
(sentry, porter, site manager)
-
7.1.2 Initial responders ;
with incident related, non CBRN specific responsibility (Guard, First Aid
employee, Police, Ambulance team)
-
7.1.3. Professional CBRN responders ; CBRN capable,
emergency response Teams (HAZMAT teams, military, decon-teams)
-
7.1.4. Emergency services:
but with no specific CBRN capabilities (ordinary fire-fighters, First Aid
hospital personnel, USAR)
-
7.1.5. Victims;
individuals that are mobile or already incapacitated, affected by the CBRN incident
and may therefore have specific protection
7.2 Explanation
The reason for introducing the above 5 categories of personnel who are
exposed to a specific incident, is that they have completely different tasks.
Typically, this requires different PPE because of varying exposure times in the
hot/warm zone. This is a consequence of the difference in their roles at the
scene of the CBRN incident their duty and level of expertise regarding
mitigating the consequences of CBRN incidents. The actual decisive parameters
are three:
- the designated responsibility
of the stakeholder;
- the awareness,
knowledge & training to use PPE;
- the time (duration)
that as a consequence of professional responsibility has to be spent at the
incident site,
For
Category 1, the duty holders, this reads as follows:
A very short time on the scene (alarming), evacuation only, no
responsibility to mitigate any CBRN effects, basic training is required.[A21]
CEN WA 44 Emergency Services Management should be
considered when pre planning for any potential CBRN incident
Category 2,
initial responders:
A limited time on the scene (initial reconnaissance & rescue), no
responsibility to mitigate the CBRN source, a suitable level of PPE and training.
Category 3;
professional CBRN responders:
An extended period of time and exposure at the scene; directly
mitigating the source / contamination / contaminated casualties; trained to use
sophisticated equipment.
Category 4;
emergency services:
A prolonged period of time on the scene; no direct mitigation of CBRN
effects; a suitable level of PPE and training.
Category 5;
victims or potential victims:
Unknown exposure time on the scene (non ambulant); no mitigation; insufficient
awareness Reduce the risk of further exposure
7.3 Targets to be protected
Regarding the tasks, responsibilities, competences, knowledge and
experiences, the protection required and appropriate PPE will be different for
the categories of exposed persons.
The three aforementioned parameters (7.2) define, per category, the
required performance (qualitative & quantitative), as well as the level of
complexity, ease of use of the appropriate PPE.
Table 1[A22] : Estimated time at the incident scene
The table below is a best estimate to indicate the process time of various categories
of stakeholders at an incident scene
|
|
Duty
holder
|
5-15 min warm zone |
8. Selection of PPE in CBRN
incidents:
The products listed below are examples which PPE should be considered
for the various functions and duties in an incident. If, however, the risk
assessment reveals specific risks which are not covered by the listing below,
PPE with higher protection factors should be selected.
As a general rule it is recommended that if in doubt select PPE with higher
protection
8.1 Selection
of PPE for personnel in a CBRN incident
The table below proposes existing PPE for all stakeholders in an
incident. This information is a starting point to select PPE.
The risk assessment process[A23] must allow the
emergency services to conduct dynamic risk assessments which could lead
to
adjustments particularly for emergency services personnel,
but might also impact on others at the CBRN scene.
The table below explains existing PPE and their related standards for
non-CBRN applications. For use at a CBRN incident, additional and specific CBRN
testing and certification is required.
Selection is based upon the minimum Nominal Protection Factor (NPF), in
case of RPE, required for the individual personnel on and at the incident.
Note: Nominal protection factors are chosen because there are no
consolidated European .assigned protection factors (see EN 529:2005)
If more than one item of CBRN PPE Is being worn, the user needs to make
sure that the different items of PPE are compatible with each other.
Note: a serious gap has been identified, since there are no standards
for the requirements and the testing of PPE ensembles, either for CBRN, or
non-CBRN.
Table 1 for selection
|
Personnel |
Minimum NPF (RPE) |
PPE |
Proposed Applications/ Comments |
|
Duty Holder |
500 |
PAPR TH3 (BS 8468-4, type1: PAPR with Hood,
Blouse or Suit - e.g. type 3 (EN 14605) or type 5 (EN 13982-1) ( BS
8468-3.1 emergency escape
breathing device with hood / NPF 2000) Isr. Standard PM-750 type 2 and type 3 Basic
head protection (EN 397, EN 812) |
5
15 min warm zone gas born: type 3 particle born; type 5 dependent on the kind of the threat |
|
Initial responder |
1000 |
Full Face Masks
with Filter(s)w. Filters (EN 136; EN 14387; filter
type B2-P3) or better: (BS
8468-2) Helmet EN 443 Footwear Garment BS 8467 or NFPA
1971;2007 with CBRN option |
5 15 min warm zone |
|
Professional CBRN
responder |
10000 |
SCBA, positive pressure + type 1 ET suit + (EN
943-2) (BS 8468-1 ) or Closed Circuit Breathing
Apparatus CCBA + +type 3 suit (EN14605, EN145) (based on BS 8468-1) BS 8467 NFPA 1971:2007 with CBRN option[A26] |
30 min hot zone 1 2 hours warm
zone |
|
Emergency services |
2000 1000 |
PAPR TM3, (BS 8468-4, Type 2:PAPR with Full Face Mask) Full Face Masks with Filter(s)w. Filters (EN 136; EN 14387; filter type B2-P3) (BS 8468-2) BS 8467 NFPA 1971;2007 with CBRN option |
30 min hot zone 3 h warm zone |
|
Victims |
50* |
Escape Hood (draftDraft
BS 8468-3.2) Escape device (DIN 58647-7) Escape Hood (Draft ANSI/ISEA 110-200x) Isr. Standard PM-750 type II and type III BS 8467 NFPA 1971;2007 with
CBRN option |
15 min. warm zone dependent on the kind of the threat |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Clean-up Work |
dependent on the
kind of the selection |
SCBA + type 1 ET suit (EN 137+EN 943-2) or Full Face Mask withFFM + Filter(s) + type 3
suits (EN 136, EN 14387 + EN 14605) or PAPR TM3 + Filter(s) + type 3 suit (EN 12941 + EN 14605) or SCBA + type 3 suit (EN 137 + EN 14605) or CCBA + type 3 suit (EN 137 + EN 14605) All 3 devices
combined with a type 3 suit BS 8467 NFPA 1971;2007 with CBRN option |
Selection depending
on risk assessment |
* Note
These
are minimal protection levels. Depending on the circumstances, higher
protection factors may be required. This will have consequences for the PPE to
be provided.
9. Performance requirements[A31]
9. 1 Protection
Only first respondcers,
professional CBRN responders and emergency services in suitable CBRN PPE should
enter the warm and hot zone of an incident/event. This will allow them to wear
the PPE over a longer period of time. For this purpose, the ergonomic design of
the PPE should allow the wearer to work in the warm and hot zone for the
required period of time.
The appropriate number of professionals CBRN responders should be
equipped with CBRN suitable PPE to allow them to enter the incident/event
without delay. Because it is difficult to predict which situation these responders are encountering when
arriving at the incident/event, at least a basic level of PPE is necessary to
avoid them becoming victims themselves.
Note1
Alarm sensors will be required to obtain information about the presence
(and possibly concentrations) of CBRN agents. This will allow a decision to be
made as to the required PPE.
Note 2
Communications will be necessary to ensure intra and
inter-organisational communication between teams members at a CBRN
incident/event and to a command post outside the incident/event. Communication
devices should be compatible to the PPE.
10. Requirements for testing
10.1. CBRN Requirements
All PPE shall be tested and certified in
accordance with existing EN standards. Since there are no European CBRN
standards, national standards for testing of CBRN PPE from USA, United Kingdom
or Israel.should be applied.
The suitability of these CBRN standards shall
be discussed and agreed upon with the notified body involved with the
certification and supervision of the quality system, according to directive
89/686/EEC.
10.2.
Marking
PPE for use in CBRN incidents shall be clearly
marked what it has been tested for. The instructions for use shall explain
which standards have been used for testing and certification. Limitations of
the products shall be mentioned, where applicable.
[A32] ] CEN WA 43 CBRN
Appropriate levels of training
should be undertaken by stakeholders on the CBRN PPE there are to use.
Reference should be
made to CEN Workshop Agreement 44 Emergency
Servces Management
Training should encompass:
- Selection and use of PPE in
CBRN incidents
CBRN threats and Hazards
Decontamination (personal), where applicable
Evacuation
Interaction with Emergency Response Teams and
Services
S.I.P Shelter in Place
Resilience
See also the content of CWA
44 related to training and excersises.
12 Recovery
12.1
Recovery should consist of and consider the following points, plus any
additional ones identified in the Risk Assessment:
- Safety conclusions as a result of risk assessment
- Selection of PPE
- Determination of hot, warm and cold zones
- PPE management
- Environmental regulations
- Disposal, decontamination of CBRN PPE
Dynamic
Risk Assessment
The following is a template example to facilitate
CBRN risk assessment
CBRN RISK ASSESSMENT
PREMISES RISK INFORMATION
|
1. Business/Area type |
|
|
2. Building/Area |
|
|
3. Address |
|
|
4. Postcode |
|
|
5. Station area |
|
|
6. Grid reference |
|
When
completing the boxes below it should be noted that this relates to the risk to
the 5 groups identified by CEN WA 43 once the premises are involved in a CBRN
incident/event
|
Principal Significant Hazards to
Stakeholders |
Hazard Rating (1 to 5) |
Probability rating (1 to 5) |
Risk Factor (Hazard x probability) |
PPE Level (1-5_ |
|
Building Collapse |
|
|
|
|
|
Explosion |
|
|
|
|
|
Flashover/Backdraught |
|
|
|
|
|
Contamination |
|
|
|
|
|
Safe Haven |
|
|
|
|
|
Rapid fire spread |
|
|
|
|
|
Undetected fire spread |
|
|
|
|
|
Building Construction |
|
|
|
|
|
Complex/Difficult Layout |
|
|
|
|
|
Basement |
|
|
|
|
|
Chemicals |
|
|
|
|
|
Large Open Spaces |
|
|
|
|
|
Ventilation |
|
|
|
|
|
Occupancy |
|
|
|
|
|
Inter Agency Operations
Required |
|
|
|
|
|
Management |
|
|
|
|
|
Lack of Water Supplies |
|
|
|
|
|
Poor Storage Practice |
|
|
|
|
|
Microbiological (Pathogens
etc.) |
|
|
|
|
|
Signature of person completing
form
. Date
|
Premises Total Risk Factor. A
Category 2 plan should be completed for premises where the result is between
XXX and XXX. A Category 3 plan must be
completed if this figure is XXX or above |
|
Signature and
recommendation of Station Commander. Category 2 plan
required? Category 3 plan
required? Yes No
.. |
|
Out of place
should follow end of the template below
Additional Information
Annex B
B.1 HAZARD
RATING TABLE
|
HAZARD SEVERITY |
RATING |
|
|
CATASTROPHIC |
Imminent danger exists, hazard is capable of
causing death and illness or difficulties in operations on a wide scale |
5 |
|
SEVERE |
Hazard can result in serious illness, severe
injury and property and equipment damage or difficulties in emergency
operations |
4 |
|
SIGNIFICANT |
Hazard can result in significant illness,
severe injury and property and equipment damage or difficulties in emergency
operations |
3 |
|
MINIMAL |
Hazard can cause illness, injury or equipment
damage, but the results would not be expected to be serious. Limited difficulties in emergency
operations could be experienced. |
2 |
|
INSIGNIFICANT |
Hazard would not result in serious injury or
illness, remote possibility of damage beyond minor first aid case. In normal circumstances no difficulties in
emergency operations should be experienced. |
1 |
This Risk Assessment process is derived
from those Safety systems used throughout the EU
and UK and endorsed by UK Health and Safety
Regulators (HSE)
B.2 PROBABILITY RATING TABLE
|
PROBABILITY |
RATING |
|
|
VERY LIKLEY TO OCCUR |
If the building is involved in a CBRN incident
the event is very likely to occur immediately or shortly. In an incident this event will occur on the
vast majority of occasions |
5 |
|
PROBABLE |
If the building is involved in a CBRN incident
the event is likely to occur immediately or shortly |
4 |
|
REASONABLY PROBABLE |
If the building is involved in a CBRN incident
the event probably will occur in time |
3 |
|
REMOTE |
If the building is involved in a CBRN incident
the event may occur in time |
2 |
|
IMPROBABABLE |
If the building is involved in a CBRN incident
the event is unlikely to occur |
1 |
B.3 RISK
FACTOR INTERPRETATION TABLE
TO BE USED FOR DETERMINING CONTROL MEASURES FOR
INDIVIDUAL HAZARDS
|
Risk Rating |
Interpretation |
|
15-25 |
Identified risks are not
acceptable. Further control measures are required. Immediate action must be taken.
Re-assess following implementation of control measures. |
|
8-12 |
Is the risk justifiable? If not,
further control measures are necessary. Re-assess following implementation of
control measures. If acceptable re-assess at review
date. |
|
1-6 |
No further control measures are
required. Re-assess at review date. |
ANNEX C
Examples of the
magnitude of hazards
When the event occurs [A36] inside confined spaces, concentrations of[A37]
any threat can theoretically build up to fairly high and dangerous
concentrations
For outside events, climatic conditions have to be taken into account.
By the time the professional (and probably even the initial)
responder arrive, there is no solid information available as to the
type and magnitude of the hazard(s). It may only be deposited by aerosol on
surfaces, clothing and casualties it may be droplets, liquids, gases or
vapours).
The usual classification of hot zone, Warm zone and Cold zone
applies with
the exception that mobile casualties can form a hot zone on their own because
of contaminated clothing, skin and hair (blood and urine will not be toxic or
contagious right away as the agents still needs to redistribute and B-agents
need to develop in the body, sputum and slime will however).
CWA: For a 1 kg VX source within 100 m: 1400 mg/m2 ground
contamination for 1 kg low volatile agent explosively discharged.
Within 100 m: VX lethal dose within 1 min after emergency at 300 m: 14
mg VX/m2 ground contamination, main contamination from clothes
mobile casualties
R: for an explosively dispersed 1 kg most dangerous radiation source,
radiation at 100 m from the event will be 100 mSievert due to aerosol cloud
(direct after explosion) and direct radiation.
For the re-aerosolising particles a respiratory particle protection is
needed. Skin protection will offer some protection against deposition of
particles and will ease decontamination, but for the highly penetrating
radiation only the ALARA principle (>distance, <time) will protect.
B: microbes will be diluted by a factor 10.000 in the first 30 meter
from the event. For a 1 kg source of highly infective agent 50 meter downwind a
respiratory particle protection factor of 10.000 is needed.
TIC
Concentrations of volatile TIC (acrylonitril, ammonia, chlorine,
hydrogen chloride, hydrogen cyanide) out of a fully ruptured 20 ton truck can
result in 1 km downwind concentrations during the first 30 minutes after the
event which the capacity delivered by usual ABEK-2 filters can barely cope
with.
Depending on the agent, the initial concentrations will have decreased
by a factor 2-10 in the 120-150 minutes timeframe after the event, resulting in
a need for a respiratory protection factor of 2-55.
Closer to the event the concentrations increase (clouds might linger
on) and protection factors up to 2000 might be needed at 100 meter distance.
At the 1 km distance, only highly toxic and fat soluble agents like hydrogen
cyanide also require some skin protection (PF 2) in the period directly after
the event. Of course closer
distances and touching of liquid or aerosol contaminated casualties
might require skin protection as well to keep body uptake (which is less than
the direct contamination) below 10-100 mg
Bibliography
Note;
Terms & definitions
See NATO document PFP (NAAG-LG7) N (2003) 1;
NATO Glossary of NBC terms & definitions; AAP (21). NU
Existing documents:
- ISO-, EN-, ASTM-, national, or other
standards.
- Directives
- Procedures, recommendations, guidance
- Military, NATO. See NATO Document PFP (NAAG-LG7) D
(2006) 0001;
ISO 1234-1, Example Standard
Reference - Part 1: First example
ISO 12345-1999, Second Example
Standard Reference
ISO 6789, Third Example Standard -
A non-published one, - [5]
Existing Standards
In addition to the Standards mentioned above the following
list of standards may well form part of the over all recommendation for the
provision of protection.
Comment:
All EN standards shall be listed here which are referred to in clause 9 PPE for
CBRN incidents:
- EN 529 shall be added because it is
needed for nominal protection factors.
Respiratory protection
Particle protection
EN 143, , EN 149, EN 405, EN
14387, EN 1827
Gas/vapour protection
EN 12941, EN 12942, EN 14387
Air supply
EN 140, EN 136, EN 14594, EN
12941, EN 12942
Hand protection
Chemical protection
EN 374-1/3, EN 420,
Fire-fighters, Heat
EN 659, EN 407, EN 12477
Mechanical Risks
EN ISO 10819, EN 388
Ionizing radiation,
radioactive Contamination
EN 421
Body protection
Chemical protection
EN 943-1/2, EN 14605, EN
13982-1/2, EN 13034
Bio-Protection
Like Chemical plus EN 14126
Nuclear
Like Chemical plus EN
1073-1/2
Heat & Flame
EN 367, EN 373, EN 469, ISO
11612, prEN ISO 14116
Heat & Flame protection
Body Protection
EN 367, EN 373, EN 469, ISO
11612, prEN ISO 14116
Head protection
Helmets
EN 397, EN 443
Others
High Visibility
EN 471
Cold & Foul Weather
ENV 342, prEN 342, EN 343,
prEN 14360
BS 8468-1:
Respiratory protective devices for use against chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents - Part 1: positive pressure, self
contained, open-circuit breathing apparatus Specification
BS 8468-2:
Respiratory protective devices for use against chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents - Part 2: negative pressure, air
purifying devices with full face mask - specification
BS 8468-3.1:
Respiratory protective devices for use against chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents - Part 3.1: Self-contained open-circuit
compressed air breathing apparatus incorporating a hood for escape -
Specification
Draft BS 8468-3.2: (remark: Similar to Smoke
Hood EN 403))
Respiratory protective devices for use against chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents - Part 3.1: Air-purifying devices
incorporating a hood for escape Specification
BS 8468-4: (PAPR with hood = type 1;
PAPR with mask = type 2)
Respiratory protective devices for use against chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear
(CBRN) agents Part 4: Powered air purifying respirators Specification
PM-750:
Personal protection hood mask - Specification
EN 14387
Respiratory protective devices - Gas
filter(s) and combined filter(s) - Requirements, testing, marking
EN 136
Respiratory
protective devices Full face masks Requirements, testing, marking.
EN ISO 13982-1
Protective clothing for use against solid
particulate chemicals - (type 5 clothing) Part 1: Performance requirements for
chemical protective clothing providing protection to the full body against
solid particulate chemicals
EN 943-2
Protective clothing against liquid and
gaseous chemicals, including liquid aerosols and solid particles Performance
requirements for gas-tight (Type 1) chemical protective suits for emergency
teams (ET)
EN 145
Respiratory protective
device Self-contained closed-circuit breathing apparatus compressed oxygen or
compressed oxygen-nitrogen type Requirements, testing, marking.
EN 140
RESPIRATORY
PROTECTIVE DEVICES - HALF MASKS AND QUARTER MASKS - REQUIREMENTS, TESTING,
MARKING
EN 405
RESPIRATORY
PROTECTIVE DEVICES - VALVED FILTERING HALF MASKS TO PROTECT AGAINST GASES OR
GASES AND PARTICLES - REQUIREMENTS, TESTING, MARKING
EN 12941
RESPIRATORY
PROTECTIVE DEVICES - POWERED FILTERING DEVICES INCORPORATING A HELMET OR A HOOD
- REQUIREMENTS, TESTING, MARKING
DIN 58647-7
Atemschutzgeräte
für Selbstrettung - Teil 7: Fluchtfiltergeräte Anforderungen, Prüfung, Kennzeichnung